

(Randy - JFK's view on Athens street)

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He believes you should insist to the point of boredom that our general war response will come only if we or our allies are subjected to major threat. Otherwise document may seem threatening or belligerent if any part of it should leak at any time.

relatively small nuclear forces deterred by ensuring that possessor will be fully targeted [but US forces on territory anyway] and may invite a first-strike attack. [Only if US remains constant] (wants to leave French in no doubt as to reasons for our move). [Valid points if thought of as "insurance" against US] importance of forces capable of discouraging bluffs of retaliation, still not impracticability of using immediate general war as a response to such tactics.

[Point out: Europe not only depends on US now for deterrence; but can't buy a cheap substitute for US deterrence. Small, credible forces would be poor "insurance" against US withdrawal; and a disastrous buy

if it promoted US withdrawal: as Pres + McV  
have threatened it would; because we won't  
remain committed to back up independent nuclear actions  
or threats.] 6

[Has any commitment of Polaris to SACEDR affect  
use of Polaris for reserve?]

See: Filler to ~~WAC~~ NAC, Apr 26 1961

Re: NAC, 8 Aug.

Convince Europe that they cannot buy a trigger  
on a US first strike; (we would withdraw commitment  
first); and we will not help them buy a trigger on a  
<sup>(against US)</sup>  
SU first strike (US second strike (and if they acquire  
force, we will lessen US association).

Don't support SU belief that US may not  
retaliate; detourer rests on that plan, on SU  
assumption of US/NATO inoperability. Separate,  
US - veto-free European world. (1) reduce SU confidence in  
US response, and (2) actually reduce US as national forces



The US nuclear weapons program is an all-out effort to provide for the nuclear protection of the Alliance.

In the event of general nuclear war, [US] forces based outside of Europe will be used.

Through the mid-1960's there can be little question about the ability of the Alliance to maintain nuclear superiority.

During the coming fiscal year the US plans to spend close to \$15 B on its nuclear weapons to assume such superiority.